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Abstract
This paper aims to quantify the municipal tax revenue effects of built-up area in-
creases. The assumed existence of these effects is one of the key reasons for ongoing
land consumption on the side of the municipalities. Some previous case studies
however suggested that these effects might be not large enough especially in rural
municipalities and would thus make land development not profitable. We estimate
the effect of built-up industrial and commercial (BIC) area change on the business
tax revenues in cross-sectional instrumental variable (IV) estimations. Based on
detailed data for Bavaria, we find a significant and positive tax revenue effect of
an increase in municipal BIC area. There exist strong differences in the size of
this effect between urban and rural municipalities. The largest effects are generated
by the BIC area in the large cities and become substantially smaller when these
are dropped from the sample. Based on these findings, we reflect on the tradable
planning permits (TPP) scheme recently discussed in the land use literature in the
context of policies aiming to limit land consumption. Furthermore, we relate our
estimates to the average municipal costs for land development and execute a number
of robustness checks.
JEL classification: H21; H25; H70; H71; R14; R52
Keywords : tax revenues; municipal taxes; land consumption; instrumental variable
regression
†Corresponding author: TU Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, and Leibniz Institute
of Ecological Urban and Regional Development (IOER), Weberplatz 1, 01217 Dresden, Germany;
Email: s.langer@ioer.de.
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the year 2000, the consumption of new land for settlement and traffic purposes in Germany reached 
129 hectares per day (German Federal Government, 2002). As a reaction, the German national 
sustainability strategy addressed this issue and set a goal of limiting built-up area and transport 
infrastructure expansion by 30 hectares per day until 2020 (ibid). The reason for this policy action was 
that Germany, as many other densely populated countries, aims to slow down the conversion of 
undeveloped land and to preserve open areas (Henger and Bizer, 2009). In the years 2012-2015, 
however, daily land consumption for settlement and traffic purposes in Germany still amounted to about 
66 hectares (German Federal Statistical Office, 2015).  
Also other European countries such as Austria and Switzerland introduced policies to reduce land 
consumption. Austria set a goal of 2.5 hectares per day until 2010 for the consumption of new land. 
However, in 2016, land consumption in Austria increased at a rate of 15 hectares per day (Environment 
Agency Austria, 2016). In Switzerland, settlement area should be stabilized at 400 m2 per capita (Swiss 
Federal Council, 2012). The EU as a whole aims to reach zero net consumption of new land until 2050 
(European Commission, 2011). The current land consumption trends however cast doubts on whether 
these political goals will be reached.  
An important reason for the ongoing consumption of new land in the developed countries like Germany 
(despite low population growth) is the competition for tax revenues, jobs and residents between 
municipalities (Krumm, 2001; Pagano, 2003; Brunori, 2004; Bizer, 2005; Zollinger and Seidl, 2005; 
Perner, 2006; Wassmer, 2008; Nuissl and Schroeter-Schlaack, 2009). The municipal governments often 
see conversion of open area and land development as an instrument to attract new firms and residents 
and thus to achieve additional tax revenues (Ladd, 1998; Michaelis, 2002; Wassmer, 2002; Wassmer, 
2003; Bizer, 2005; Gottlieb, 2006; Henger and Thomä, 2009; Paulsen, 2013; Brandt, 2014). This is 
particularly the case in Germany where local authorities are responsible for the development and the 
allocation of land (Siedentop et al., 2009; Henger and Thomä, 2009).  
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Although the tax revenue impact of land consumption1 is commonly assumed intact and strong (Lucy 
and Fisher, 2000; Wassmer, 2002; Reidenbach et al., 2007; European Commission, 2012), to the best of 
our knowledge, there are no empirical estimates of this relationship for a large sample of municipalities. 
Related research usually takes the form of case studies. For example, the cost of community service 
studies (COCS) in the U.S. usually contain calculations for the fiscal balance of individual land 
consumption projects (Leighton and Meyer, 1999; Dorfman, 2006).  In Germany, relatively few such 
case studies exist (e.g. Gutsche, 2003; Krause-Junk, 2007; Bizer, 2005; Artmann, 2013).  
An indication that the assumed link between land consumption and tax revenues might not be generally 
valid comes e.g. from Mönnich (2005) or Sbosny and Siebert (2010). These authors refer to a situation 
where neighboring municipalities simultaneously choose to convert open areas in order to attract firms 
and residents as “ruinous competition” that leaves many municipalities with losses rather than with 
profits. Other authors show in particular that there is a general overestimation (on the side of the 
municipalities) of the effects of new industrial and commercial sites on tax revenues (Bade et al., 1993; 
Gutsche, 2003; Krause-Junk, 2007; Reidenbach et al., 2007; Schweppe-Kraft et al., 2008; Wixforth, 
2009). The latter types of land use constitute the focus of this paper. 
The conversion of land for industrial and commercial use is one component of the overall land 
consumption, from which the German municipalities may directly expect future tax revenues. After 
starting their business activities, most newly settled companies in Germany are obliged to pay local 
business taxes. These business taxes constitute a large share of the municipal budgets. For other types 
of land use, e.g. housing, transport or recreation, the connection to the municipal tax revenues is not as 
direct. In order to test the validity and the strength of the link between land consumption and municipal 
tax revenues, this paper thus focuses on the tax effects of changes in the built-up industrial and 
commercial (BIC) area. This indicator shows the actual land consumption, i.e. realizations of 
construction projects for industrial and commercial purposes. We are the first that bring it into the 
discussion. 
                                                     
1 By land consumption in this paper we mean actual built-up area and transport infrastructure expansion. 
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For our analysis, we chose the federal state of Bavaria because data availability compared to the other 
German states is particularly good. Furthermore, Bavaria consists of a high number (2054) of 
municipalities, which are very heterogeneous in size, population density, industry structure etc. A 
German-wide analysis was not possible due to lack of synchronized land consumption data. The 
consumption of new land in Bavaria accounts to about 22 % of the German total (cf. Bavarian State 
Office for the Environment, 2015).  
From the economic theory viewpoint, this paper is connected to the public choice literature. An 
assumption taken by some authors within this field is that the municipalities’ aim is to maximize their 
tax revenues. This assumption is taken e.g. in the Leviathan theory developed by Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980), which was analyzed further by Edwards and Keen (1996) and Feld (2014). According to this 
theory, local policies are chosen strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. The more 
municipalities exist, the less expensive is emigration of firms and households. The openness leads to 
competition between local governments (Feld, 2014). A prediction of this theory, put in the context of 
our paper, is that a municipality would actively develop land or allocate open space for industrial and 
commercial purposes if this will attract companies, which the municipal government can tax (Henger 
and Thomä, 2009; Paulsen, 2013). 
To achieve the German 30-hectares goal, a tradable planning permit scheme (TPP) is discussed in the 
literature (Bovet, 2006; Schweppe-Kraft et al., 2008; Henger and Bizer, 2010). These authors argue that 
TPP is an appropriate economic instrument, which can be more effective than stricter planning controls 
to manage land consumption. The TPP approach is based on a cap-and-trade principle to meet predefined 
goals. Under such a scheme, areas with higher land demand would tend to buy planning permits from 
areas with less land demand once their contingents are exhausted and as long as it is profitable to do so. 
This coordination process under the TPP scheme would lead to an efficient allocation based on the 
municipalities’ willingness to pay2.  
                                                     
2 For a critical evaluation on the TPP scheme, see Davy (2009). For a broader insight on development rights as a 
market-based land use planning tool, see e.g. Linkous (2017). 
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Given the large literature on agglomeration effects in regard to land use and land prices (e.g. Verhoef 
and Nijkamp, 2008; Lin and Ben, 2009; Combes et al., 2013; Ahrend and Lembcke, 2016), we can 
expect that the tax effects from land consumption (and willingness to pay for planning permits) are 
higher in urban compared to rural areas. Within urban areas, these effects are arguably higher in more 
densely populated cities. A particular research question in this paper focuses on quantifying tax revenue 
effects of land consumption in different municipality types.  
This paper thus seeks to fill the gap of an empirical study that investigates the tax revenue effects of 
land consumption for a large sample of municipalities. Specifically, we aim to estimate the effect of the 
BIC area changes on the business tax revenues in cross-sectional IV estimations. We use data on 
municipalities in Bavaria for the period 2009-2013. We find a positive and significant effect of the BIC 
area on the business tax revenues in Bavarian municipalities. Furthermore, significant differences 
between more and less densely populated municipalities are detected. Identified heterogeneity reveals 
where land consumption is more and less profitable for municipalities. These findings enable us to draw 
conclusions on the possibility of achieving land saving via a tradable planning permits (TPP) scheme. 
Furthermore, we relate our estimates to the costs of land development and reflect on the validity of the 
“ruinous competition” hypothesis. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the institutional background, which is 
followed by a section presenting the data used. The fourth section examines the empirical method and 
the identification challenges. Section 5 presents and discusses the key results, followed by robustness 
checks in section 6. Section 7 discusses the findings in the light of land development costs and tradable 
planning permits, and section 8 concludes. 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: MUNICIPAL BUSINESS TAXES AND LAND USE 
PLANNING 
According to Article 106 (6) of the German constitutional law, municipal governments possess tax 
sovereignty on impersonal taxes such as property and business taxes (Rudzio, 2011). As far as business 
tax is concerned, the German Business Tax Act (Gewerbesteuergesetz) determines the general 
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assessment base and a common part of the tax rate (Steuermesszahl). The actual tax rate is formed by 
multiplying the common part by a tax multiplier, which is set by every municipality. This tax multiplier 
shows a large variation across municipalities ranging from 230 to 490 within Bavaria.  
The business tax is levied on domestic businesses – with an exception of freelancers, public and 
agricultural businesses. Due to determination rules, only businesses with positive earnings are taxed.3 
In the case that a company owns several business establishments in different municipalities, business 
profits are split over all establishments depending on the total wage bill. This means, even if a company 
makes no profit at the local branch, the municipality still gets tax payments from total profits of the 
company’s other branches (Reidenbach et al., 2007).  
In Bavaria in the study period, about 45 percent of all commercial businesses had a positive tax rate 
(Bavarian State Office for Statistics, 2012). The business tax accounted for more than one third of all 
municipal revenues (Bavarian State Office for Statistics, 2013).  
An important task of the municipal planners is to set up a land use plan, even though it is not mandatory. 
The German Building Code indicates that the main task of the urban land use planning is to arrange and 
manage the usage of properties and its construction design (Article 1). This land use plan is the only 
planning document with a direct legal effect for municipalities and defines clear rules for the allocation 
of building rights (Perner 2006). The municipalities are free in adopting this plan due to their planning 
autonomy. 
  
                                                     
3 By a business tax levy (Gewerbesteuer-Umlage) the municipalities pass a part of business tax revenues to the 
federation and the federal states – which yields the net value 
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DATA SOURCES  
Built-up industrial and commercial area  
The federal state of Bavaria with its 2,056 politically independent municipalities is the largest German 
federal state (70,550 square kilometers (km2) or 7.055 million hectare) and the second most populous 
state (12.44 million inhabitants). In addition, it has 199 unincorporated areas that mainly contain lakes 
and forests - where no land is used for industrial and commercial purposes. Those areas were excluded 
from our analysis.  
Data on BIC area in Bavaria stem from the IOER Monitor4, which is based on official topographic base 
data, the so-called ATKIS Basic Digital Landscape Model (ATKIS Basic DLM) of the Authoritative 
Topographic and Cartographic Information System (Amtliches Topographisch-Kartographisches 
Informationssystem, ATKIS). It is the most important input dataset for the IOER Monitor land-use/ land-
cover indicators (Krüger et al., 2013; Meinel and Krüger, 2014).  
Geometrically and semantically, the ATKIS Basic DLM is the most precise topographical dataset 
available for Germany (Röber et al., 2009). The update cycles vary among the federal states. In the study 
period, the data actuality for Bavaria is two years delayed. 
We focus on the change in the BIC area, which solely describes land consumption (realized demand) 
for industrial and commercial purposes. Out of the daily land consumption of about 15 hectares in 
Bavaria in 2013 – following the IOER Monitor- settlement area (including recreational area and other 
open space area) accounts for about 70 %, while traffic area makes up the rest of this daily increase. The 
BIC area belongs to the settlement area and accounts for about 20 % of its daily increase.5 
Due to lower frequency of data updating before 2009, the dataset for Bavaria used in this paper covers 
the years 2009 to 2013 only. For the years before 2009, also several other necessary control variables 
                                                     
4 IOER. Monitor of Settlement and Open Space Development. Online: www.ioer-monitor.de. 
5 Differences in the size of different area categories between the IOER Monitor and the official statistics of Bavaria 
exist due to varying survey procedures. As mentioned above the ATKIS Basic DLM is the basis for the IOER 
Monitor, in contrast the official statistics uses real estate cataster data. 
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from the Genesis Database6 were not available. Because the BIC area data are not reported strictly every 
year, we also preferred to estimate a regression model in 2009-2013 differences, rather than a panel 
regression. 
     
Figure 1. Map of Bavarian municipalities and the change of BIC area in the period 2009-2013 
 
Figure 1 shows the changes in the BIC area in the federal state of Bavaria between 2009 and 2013. The 
white spots are unincorporated areas. We highlight the areas that built up more than 1.1 ha (orange), 
experienced an absolute change of less than 1 ha (grey) and regained more than 1 ha (blue) of BIC area 
in this period. The map indicates that new land consumption is a phenomenon, which is not specific to 
certain parts of Bavaria only; rather, it is quite widespread.  
                                                     
6 Municipal data was made available from the Genesis database Bavaria. It is a database, which contains official 
statistical data of the Bavarian State Office for Statistics.  
Online: https://www.statistikdaten.bayern.de/genesis/online/data?operation=sprachwechsel&option=en. 
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In the regression analysis that follows, business tax revenues are the dependent variable. The BIC area 
is the main independent variable. We expect this variable to have a positive impact, because it accounts 
for the companies’ settlement and enlargement. The more industrial and commercial area is used, the 
higher should be the business tax revenue impact.  
Earlier studies demonstrated that other important variables to explain tax revenues of municipalities are 
inter alia the tax multiplier, economic output, unemployment rate, population, and employment structure 
(Buettner, 2003; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Hasset and Brill, 2007). Further control variables thus aim 
to capture these influencing factors.  
 
Other control variables  
Municipal data (economic and socio-demographic variables) for the period 2009-2013 were extracted 
from the Genesis database for Bavaria for 2054 of the 2056 municipalities (no data for Schöllkrippen 
and Himmelkron). It includes the following variables: the business tax revenues, the municipal business 
tax multiplier, population, population density, the debt level per capita, the number of unemployed 
persons per capita7, share of the employees in the manufacturing industry, and taxable turnover from 
products and services. We normalized all monetary values using the consumer price index with the base 
year 2010. 
Due to the right of municipalities to set their own tax multiplier, the tax multiplier has a direct impact 
on the amount of the business tax revenues, respectively. It between 230 and 490 percentage points. 
This variable determines the financial burden businesses have to bear depending on the municipality, in 
which they are located. The impact of the multiplier on tax revenue may be negative or positive, 
following a Laffer curve similar course8. There is also a reverse causality between tax revenue and tax 
multiplier. This means that if business tax revenues are too low, a jurisdiction could increase the tax 
multiplier in order to increase business tax revenues. We follow Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) as well as 
                                                     
7 The unemployment rate is not applicable at municipal level in Bavaria – therefore we apply the unemployed 
persons per capita. 
8 The higher the tax multiplier, the larger the business tax revenues, but at a certain point the multiplier could be 
too high and thus business tax revenues start to decrease. 
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Hasset and Brill (2007) and apply lagged values for the business tax multiplier to address this 
simultaneity problem. In our main estimation, we use a lag of one year, which is replaced by a longer 
lag of five years in the robustness checks.  
We assume that municipalities that are less in debt are more attractive for companies9. Therefore, debt 
level per capita should have a negative impact on the business tax revenues. Unemployment per capita 
is an indicator to control for temporary shocks to the local economy. The more unemployed people 
reside in a municipality, the lower may the business tax revenues be because of an assumed lower 
amount of firms. To control for the economic structure, the share of employees in the manufacturing 
industry is among other variables included. As a control for the size of the local economy, taxable 
turnover from sales of products and services is included in the regression. It is a proxy for the economic 
output and should have a positive impact on the business tax revenue. Population density controls for 
further differences between the municipalities. There is a strong variation of population from below 250 
residents up to almost 1.5 million. There are very densely populated cities and rural areas with almost 
no land demanding industry. 
In addition, at more aggregate, county level, the INKAR database provides data such as the gross 
domestic product (GDP), a share of small and big companies as a proportion of all companies and the 
gross value added (GVA) by sector. The economic sectors are industry (production industry), private 
services (financial industry), public services (public and social services, education and health) and trade 
(trade, hospitality sector, information and communication). Those variables are used as additional 
controls because they represent further proxies for the economic output or economic structure at county 
level.  
                                                     
9 Municipalities less in debt mostly have a bigger financial leeway and provide a higher level of spending (Buettner, 
2001). 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
          Obs. in the 
cross 
section 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent variable 
     
Business tax revenue, in million euro 2,054 0.97 17.19 -29.15 744.78 
Control variables at municipal level 
     
Built-up industrial and commercial 
(BIC) area, in km2 
1,695 0.48 0.1 -0.33 0.86 
Business tax multiplier, in % 2,054 7.89 18.64 -50 85 
Share of employees in the 
manufacturing industry, in % 
1,982 -0.01 0.07 -0.6 0.37 
Taxable turnover from products and 
services, in million euro 
2,025 38.31 433.27 -5,579.48 14,696 
Debt level per capita, in Thsd. Euro 1,757 -0.002 0.36 -2.77 2.69 
Population, in Thsd. 2,054 45.62 1,773.85 -8,497 77,396 
Population density, per km2 2,054 0.47 12.92 -104.29 249.02 
Unemployed per capita 2,054 -0.004 0.004 -0.03 0.02 
Additional control variables at county 
level 
     
Gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita, in Thsd. Euro 
96 4.6 2.08 0.6 55 
Share of small companies (≤ 10 
employees), as proportion of all 
companies in ‰ 
96 -6.72 3.28 -18.6 3.3 
Share of big companies (>250 
employees), as proportion of all 
companies in ‰ 
96 0.28 0.35 -1.2 1.4 
Gross value added: Industry, in % 96 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.14 
Gross value added: Private services, in 
% 
96 -0.02 0.02 -0.1 0.07 
Gross value added: Public services, in % 96 -0.009 0.02 -0.07 0.3 
Gross value added: Trade, in % 96 -0.004 0.02 -0.06 0.09 
Instrument      
Agricultural area and major parts of 
urban open space area 1995, in km2 
2054 18.38 13.52 0.49 98.05 
Notes: The table shows mean, standard deviation, min and max of changes between observations 2009-2013 by 
municipality. Monetary values in euro, prices of 2010.  
 
 
As can be seen from Table 1 – the summary statistics of the variables – there is mostly a large variation 
in the variables.10 
 
                                                     
10 Because the municipality Munich is an extreme outlier regarding large business tax revenues per capita (1,247.5 
Euro), BIC area (26.5 km2) and other controls, it is excluded from the estimations. This will be examined again in 
the robustness section. 
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EMPIRICAL METHOD AND IDENTIFICATION CHALLENGES 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation 
To investigate the role of the BIC area and other relevant covariates in explaining the business tax 
revenue, we first estimate an OLS regression on the differenced cross-sectional data. This means, we 
examine purely cross-sectional relationships using “between-effects” OLS regressions: 
∆𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∆𝐵𝐼𝐶_𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖 ∆𝑋𝑖 +∈𝑖               (1) 
 
where yi indicates the dependent variable, i.e. the business tax revenues in municipality i. The variable 
BIC_areai represents the BIC area in municipality i. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of other control variables in 
municipality i such as the tax multiplier, the debt level, the taxable turnover from products and services, 
etc. Also variables on county level are included in the regressions. All variables are measured as five-
year difference between years 2013 and 2009. β0, β1, γi are the coefficients to be estimated. Robust 
standard errors are applied in all estimations. 
 
Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables (IVs) 
There is a potential problem in assuming the exogeneity of the BIC area in the OLS regression. As 
shown above, the business tax is the most important municipal revenue component. Planning, 
development and land use decisions can be influenced by the financial status of a municipality and hence 
also by its business tax revenues (cf. Song and Zenou, 2006). For instance, the tax revenue situation of 
the municipality may affect the provision of the local public goods and thus influence the demand for 
land in the municipality. 
Several studies in the land use literature consider this simultaneity between tax revenues and land use. 
For example, Song and Zenou (2006) estimate the effect of the property tax rate on urban sprawl. They 
address the endogeneity issue by employing an instrumental variable approach and make use of state 
aid to schools as an instrument for the endogenous property tax variable. Brückner and Fansler (1983), 
McGrath (2005) and Geshkov and DeSalvo (2012) mention the presence of reverse causality but do not 
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address potential biases in their estimations. Geshkov and DeSalvo (2012) suggest interpreting the 
results where endogeneity is not corrected as partial correlations that indicate empirical regularities.11 
However, if endogeneity due to simultaneity exists, OLS estimation is biased and cannot be interpreted 
causally. To address this issue we employ an instrumental variables (IV) regression using two-stage 
least squares (2SLS). A valid instrument should be highly correlated with the endogenous regressor but 
uncorrelated with the error term. 
To isolate the effect of the BIC area on the business tax revenues, we need an instrument, which is not 
related with the business tax revenues, but predicts the changes of the BIC area. Our identification 
strategy is based on using the open space area in the municipality in the year 1995 as an instrument for 
the BIC area change between 2009 and 2013. More precisely, the measure for the open space that we 
use includes the agricultural area as well as major parts of urban open space such as parks, urban gardens, 
recreational and sports areas. The area of forests, mountains and water surfaces is not included into this 
measure.  
Open space area in 1995 is an indicator for the maximum possible amount of land consumption for 
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipal boundaries. Over the course of time, open 
space is developed and sealed. The assumption we make by choosing open space area as an instrument 
is that the more open space a municipality had in 1995, the more area could be built-up for industrial 
and commercial purposes later on. We thus expect a positive association between the instrument and the 
BIC area change. The first stage of the 2SLS regression will examine this fact.  
We claim that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term. There is no direct effect of the 
municipal open space in 1995 on the business tax revenues in 2009-2013, which is not running through 
the endogenous regressor (change in the BIC area).12 We address the potential effects running through 
                                                     
11 In the land use literature, a number of papers studied the reverse effect chain. They examined the effect of tax 
rates or tax revenues and other control variables on the size of urbanized areas, urban sprawl or land consumption. 
A significant and negative effect of the property tax rates on the size of the urbanized area was found (Song and 
Zenou, 2006; Wassmer, 2008; Geshkov and De Salvo, 2012). On the other hand, also a significant and positive 
effect of tax revenues (including business tax) on land consumption was found (Siedentop et al., 2009). 
12 To support this argument, we performed an OLS estimation in which we regressed the dependent variable 
(business tax revenues) on the endogenous regressor, the instrumental variable and further control variables 
(available upon request). To meet the exclusion restrictions of a strictly exogenous instrument, the coefficient in 
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omitted variables by a well-considered set of control variables. Furthermore, we rule out any reverse 
effect of the dependent variable on the instrument due to a large time lag between them. The exogeneity 
of the instrument can in general not be tested. Nevertheless, in summary, we can rule out any direct 
effect of our instrument on the dependent variable and vice versa (exclusion restriction). Furthermore, 
we test alternative definitions for the instrument, including the areas of forests, mountains and water 
surfaces, which however does not affect the results significantly. 
In the first stage, the change in the industrial and commercial area is decomposed into a component 
explained by the instrument and a problematic component vi. The first stage is specified as follows:  
∆𝐵𝐼𝐶_𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝑆𝑖 + ∑ 𝜇𝑖 ∆𝑋𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,     where                                           (2) 
∆BIC_areai = change of BIC area between 2009 and 2013 in the municipality i; 
OSi= open space area as of 1995 in the municipality i; 
X = Vector of other explanatory variables.  
In the second stage, the fitted values of ∆𝐵𝐼𝐶 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎̂  from the first stage are used instead of the 
problematic (endogenous) value of ∆BIC area in equation (1). The second stage is specified as follows:   
∆𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐵𝐼𝐶_𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎̂ 𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖 ∆𝑋𝑖 +∈𝑖,     where                                              (3) 
yi= dependent variable of interest, i.e. business tax revenues of municipality i. 
To be valid, the instrument must also be relevant (correlated with the endogenous regressor). To get an 
indication of the relevance of the instrument, the first stage Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is considered. 
To test whether the effect of the instrument is significantly different from zero, as a rule of thumb, this 
F-statistic must be larger than 10.  
In the econometric estimations, we do two things to make sure that our findings are not biased by bad 
controls. First, we estimate a parsimonious model that regresses the business tax revenues on the BIC 
area, without further controls. Further control variables – at municipal and county level - are added in 
                                                     
front of the instrumental variable should be statistically zero (Wooldridge, 2002). The estimation indicated that 
there is no direct effect of the instrumental variable on our dependent variable. 
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subsequent estimations. Second, we present a variety of different specifications and robustness checks 
in a separate section13.  
RESULTS 
Main specifications 
Table 2 presents the cross-sectional OLS (columns 1 and 2) and IV (columns 3, 4 and 5) estimation 
results. In the OLS case, the coefficient of the BIC area decreases from about 20.8 €/m2 in the 
parsimonious model to 12.7 €/m2 in the model that includes further control variables. As discussed 
above, the OLS results are likely to be biased and should therefore be considered with caution. 
Therefore, we now turn to the IV estimations. As the significance of the corresponding coefficients from 
the first stage regressions indicate, our instrument is a strong predictor for the BIC area change. As 
expected, the coefficient is positive. In addition, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic is reported in the 
last row of Table 2 as a test of the strength of our instrument. The F-statistic values above 10 indicate 
that the instrument is strong and relevant. This implies, for a single instrument and one endogenous 
regressor, the t-value for the instrument should be bigger than 3.2 to confirm the instrument’s relevance, 
which is met in all first-stage estimations as indicated (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 We also tried to employ the panel structure of our data and conducted fixed effects (year and municipality) 
regressions with the full dataset (2009-2013). Endogeneity issues could however not be addressed in this setting, 
due to the lack of a suitable time-varying instrument. Nevertheless, the results from the panel data regressions are 
close to the results found in the cross-sectional IV regressions and are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 2. Effects of the BIC area on the business tax revenues. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Built-up industrial and 
commercial area 
20.81*** 
(7.56) 
12.73** 
(5.49) 
20.52*** 
(7.84) 
16.9*** 
(4.97) 
12.85*** 
(3.57) 
Control variables at 
municipal level 
NO  NO   
Business tax multiplier 
(one year lagged) 
 0.015** 
(0.007) 
 0.006 
(0.004) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
Debt level per capita  -0.758* 
(0.367) 
 -1.07** 
(0.451) 
-0.757* 
(0.395) 
Population density  0.028 
(0.034) 
 0.03 
(0.037) 
0.028 
(0.035) 
Unemployed per capita  -27.13 
(35.37) 
 -38.15 
(44.24) 
-26.78 
(40.39) 
Share of employees in the 
manufact. industry  
  0.818 
(0.871) 
 0.019 
(0.83) 
0.82 
(0.881) 
Taxable turnover from 
products and services 
 0.005* 
(0.003) 
 0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
Further controls at county 
level 
NO  NO NO  
% GVA Industry  -13.09 
(8.37) 
  -13.09 
(8.35) 
% GVA Public services  12.97 
(9.55) 
  12.92 
(9.74) 
% GVA Private services  -0.85 
(6.75) 
  -0.87 
(6.9) 
GDP per capita  0.828** 
(0.397) 
  0.827** 
(0.394) 
Share of big companies  -0.057 
(0.447) 
  -0.056 
(0.436) 
N 1694 1383 1694 1383 1383 
F test 7.58 1.90 6.84 2.8 2.53 
R2 0.1362 0.3792 0.1492 0.2997 0.3893 
First-stage results:  
Open space 1995   0.003*** 
(0.0003) 
0.003*** 
(0.0003) 
0.003*** 
(0.0003) 
t-value   10.34 9.36 9.20 
First-stage diagnostic      
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic   106.99 87.61 84.70 
Note: Dependent variable is the business tax revenue change. All variables are measured as differences between 
2013 and 2009 values. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 2SLS 
regressions—variables excluded from second stage: open space area 1995. 
 
In the parsimonious formulation, the coefficients for the BIC area change - the variable of primary 
interest - differ only slightly between the OLS (column 1) and IV (column 3) estimations and are in the 
order of 21 €/m2. This coefficient decreases to about 17 €/m2 in the IV estimation when the control 
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variables at municipal level are added (column 4). In the full model (column 5), the coefficient of the 
BIC area again decreases to almost 13 €/m2 in the second stage IV estimation. Accordingly, each one 
hectare increase in the industrial and business area implies an almost 13,000 euro increase in the business 
tax revenues of a municipality. We will compare this value with the costs of first-time land development 
in the discussion section. Compared to the OLS estimation, the coefficient of the full IV model is only 
0.1 €/m2 larger, which could be interpreted as a slight downward bias on the side of the OLS estimates. 
The signs of statistically significant coefficients conform to our predictions. The business tax multiplier 
and the taxable turnover from products and services have positive and significant coefficients. The 
business tax revenue is an increasing function of the business tax multiplier at this point of the Laffer 
curve. The debt level coefficient is negative and significant, also as expected. At county level only the 
GDP per capita has a positive and significant coefficient. 
 
Urban-rural differentials 
In Table 2, we report the mean effect of the BIC area on the business tax revenues including a set of 
relevant controls. An additional question of interest concerns the differences between area types. In this 
subsection, we therefore aim to look in detail at the differences in this effect between more and less 
densely populated, rural and urban municipalities. We will isolate the effect of BIC area increase on tax 
revenues in certain types of municipalities by adding different interaction terms to the IV regression 
specified in column (5) of Table 2.  
The first set of interaction terms is formed by multiplying the change in the BIC area by a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the municipality belongs to a certain top quantile with respect to population density. 
We construct such dummy variables for the top 75%, 50%, 25%, 10% and 5% of most densely populated 
municipalities. We run a separate regression for each of these five cases. In addition, two more 
regressions are estimated, which use the BBSR area types14 for creating the interaction terms. In these 
                                                     
14 The BBSR area types are taken from: 
http://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/Raumbeobachtung/Raumabgrenzungen/Raumtypen2010_vbg/Raumtypen20
10_alt.html?nn=443270. 
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cases, the dummy variable is equal to 1 if the municipality is classified as at least partially urban or as 
mostly urban.  
The results are presented in Table 3. Two coefficients are reported in every column. The coefficient for 
the variable “BIC area change” alone shows the effect of land consumption on tax revenues in the 
municipalities not belonging to the respective top quantile. The sum of the two coefficients then shows 
the effect for the municipalities in the top quantile.  
In Table 3, there is always a significant difference between more and less densely populated areas. 
Moreover, the size of the effect increases for higher density quantiles. The results thus suggest that the 
business tax revenues from BIC area change are larger the more densely populated the municipalities 
are. However, this effect seems to be driven by the few most densely populated municipalities, which 
are the major cities in Bavaria. The difference between these cities and the rural areas can be visualized 
by comparing the estimate of 7 €/m2 for the 25% of least densely populated municipalities (column 1) 
to almost 54 €/m2 for the top 5% (column 6).   
The same tendency is found when we differentiate the municipalities according to the BBSR area types. 
Column (7) and (8) indicate that mostly urban areas receive more tax revenues per m2 of the BIC area 
than areas that are less urbanized. 
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Table 3. IV estimations including interaction terms 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Interaction dummy Top 75 % Top 50 % Top 25 % Top 10 %  Top 5% Partially or  
mostly 
urban 
Mostly 
urban 
BIC area change 7.01*** 
(3.82) 
6.16** 
(2.8) 
6.69** 
(2.63) 
7.27*** 
(2.24) 
6.83*** 
(2.18) 
5.01** 
(2.48) 
7.14*** 
(2.43) 
BIC area change x 
Interaction dummy  
7.25*** 
(3.44) 
13.18*** 
(3.9) 
22.16*** 
(6.32) 
42.62*** 
(10.97) 
53.29*** 
(13.28) 
19.71*** 
(5.07) 
34.61*** 
(9.02) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 
F 2.64 2.64 2.65 3.64 4.52 2.80 2.94 
R2 0.3965 0.4155 0.4518 0.5589 0.6172 0.4350 0.4857 
First-stage diagnostic        
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 45.59 49.08 51.66 47.67 50.94 39.88 50.93 
Note: Dependent variable is the business tax revenue change. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 2SLS regressions - variables excluded from second stage: open space area 1995. 
 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section we perform a number of robustness checks to explore whether the key results are stable. 
In doing so, we concentrate on the main coefficient of interest, the effect of BIC area change on the 
change in municipal business tax revenues. We build on the cross-sectional IV specification including 
all available control variables at municipal as well as county level.  
First, we change the time span of the cross-sectional difference IV regression to the period 2009-2012 
and 2010-2013. This is a check on whether the estimated coefficients mainly depend on the years 
analyzed or whether general, consistent statements can be derived. As can be seen from Table 4 
(columns 1 and 2), the effects are roughly 10 and 21 €/m2, respectively, and statistically significant. Our 
main estimate of almost 13 €/m2 from Table 2 lies between these two estimates and the deviations from 
this point estimate are not statistically significant, as suggested by the Wald tests. 
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Table 4. Robustness checks. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
 2009-2012 2010-2013 5 year lag  
of the tax 
multiplier 
Business 
tax revenue 
above zero 
Extreme 
residuals 
excluded 
Cities with 
county 
status 
excluded 
 
Built-up industrial and commercial 
area 
21.09*** 
(5.58) 
10.29** 
(4.03) 
12.54*** 
(3.56) 
14.42*** 
(4.32) 
7.16*** 
(1.70) 
6.84*** 
(1.69) 
Wald test (p-value)  
H0= coefficient not signif. different 
from 12.85 (coefficient main 
specification)  
0.1403 0.5263 0.9326 0.7157 0.0008 0.0004 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES YES YES  
N 1472 1339 1383 1044 1373 1363  
F 2.33 2.44 2.71 2.78 8.22 3.22  
R2 0.2729 0.5254 0.3867 0.4915 0.3202 0.09  
First-stage IV results:  
Open space 1995 0.002*** 
(0.0002) 
0.002*** 
(0.0002) 
0.003*** 
(0.0003) 
0.003*** 
(0.0004) 
0.003*** 
(0.0003) 
0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
 
t-value 8.64 8.21 9.21 7.63 8.98 8.63  
First-stage diagnostic        
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 74.66 67.39 84.90 58.22 80.65 74.49  
Note: Dependent variable is the business tax revenue change. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 2SLS regressions - variables excluded from second stage: open space area 1995. 
 
In the second robustness check, we use a five-year lag instead of the one-year lag of the change in the 
business tax multiplier (2004-2008 instead of 2008-2012). As discussed above, there is a reverse 
causality between the tax revenue and the tax multiplier. In the main estimation we followed Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2007) as well as Hasset and Brill (2007) and applied one year lagged values for the business 
tax multiplier. The longer time lag is supposed to reduce the endogeneity concerns. The results in column 
(3) show that the new estimate is not significantly different from the main estimate. 
Next, we exclude those municipalities that in 2013 received less business tax revenues compared to 
2009. Thereby we check whether the main results are influenced (biased downward) by the 
municipalities with a negative tax revenue development. As can be seen from column (4), the coefficient 
is only slightly (not significantly) larger compared to the main specification. 
As a further robustness check, we exclude from the estimations municipalities whose studentized 
residuals stick out from the other municipalities. We also look at the leverage’s to identify observations 
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that have great influence on regression coefficients. In this way, we check whether the main results could 
be outlier-driven. 
Figure 2 (left panel) plots the business tax revenues against the BIC area for all municipalities, including 
Munich. This scatter plot suggests that the observation for Munich stands out from all other points. The 
exclusion of Munich in previous estimations was thus legit. However, other municipalities could 
potentially be unusual or influential, as well.  
Therefore, we examine the residuals from the full IV regression (Table 2, column 5).Fehler! 
Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. In Figure 2 (right panel) we present the leverages 
(deviation of the dependent variable from its mean) plotted against the squared normalized residuals to 
identify observations that will potentially have big influence on the estimates. From this analysis, again 
some of the cities with county status – e.g. Nuremberg, Regensburg, Ismaning, Coburg, Hallbergmoos 
and Ingolstadt – stand out due to their large leverage or large residuals squared. 
 
Figure 2. Outlier and leverage analysis 
    
In column (5) of Table 4 we exclude those municipalities that based on the analysis above have potential 
large influence on the regression coefficient estimates. These are in particular the municipalities of 
Nuremberg, Regensburg, Ingolstadt, Coburg, Ismaning, Hallbergmoos. In a final check (column 6), we 
exclude all cities with county status. 
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As can be seen from columns (5) and (6), the BIC area coefficient drops to 7.16 and 6.84, respectively, 
and these estimates are significantly different from the main estimate from Table 2. This finding again 
can be regarded as an indicator for the large heterogeneity among the municipalities in terms of the tax 
revenue effects from BIC area change. Especially cities with county status receive more business tax 
revenues. The R2 as a measure of fit also decreases strongly, which indicates that the main results are 
largely driven by these excluded municipalities (main cities). 
DISCUSSION: LAND DEVELOPMENT COSTS AND DEVELOPMENT PERMITS 
How large are the identified tax revenue effects of BIC area change? Although it is not possible to draw 
specific conclusions about the profitability of land development for different municipalities from the 
available data, we can try to compare our estimates to the indicative figures on the costs of land 
development.15 Reidenbach et al. (2007) and Köller and Henger (2010) report that the costs of initial 
land development for industrial and commercial purposes in Germany are in the range of 15-35 €/m2. 
This range includes internal as well as external land development costs16, planning costs, compensation 
costs and partly social costs (e.g. social infrastructure such as kindergartens and schools). This does not 
include the potential costs of land purchase from private owners as well as potential negative effects on 
general purpose and need-based transfers and can thus be regarded as a minimum range. Additionally, 
annual operating expenses for the developed area are in the range of of 3-4 €/m2 (Reidenbach et al., 
2007) which is also considered a minimum.  
Given these figures, one can seriously doubt that land development efforts, especially in rural 
municipalities, will usually bring enough tax returns to cover the development and maintenance costs. 
They rather confirm the relevance of the warning about ruinous competition between the municipalities 
as articulated by Mönnich (2005) or Sbosny and Siebert (2010). For economically strong urban areas, 
                                                     
15 Cost and community service studies aim to provide a complete picture of revenues and expenditures for selected 
case study regions. They evaluate the fiscal situation of land consumption projects considering available 
information and data (Dorfman, 2006; Leighton and Meyer, 1999). Assessing real costs for planning and land 
development is very challenging. The provision of building land for industrial and commercial purposes differs 
widely regionally and depending on the economic sector of the settling businesses. 
16 The costs involve construction measures such as the connection to public road network as well as supply and 
disposal which can be on-site (internal) or off-site (external) of the building area. In this example the municipalities 
bear only 10 % of costs for internal land development and 100 % for external land development. 
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the fiscal balance of land development is better, which also provides background to the discussion on 
the tradable planning permits as an economic instrument to effectively and transparently control land 
consumption (Bovet, 2006; Schweppe-Kraft et al., 2008; Henger and Thomä, 2009; Henger and Bizer, 
2009; Henger, 2013).  
Given the large differences in the tax effects of BIC area change between areas identified in this study, 
such a mechanism seems a reasonable tool to limit the potentially unprofitable land development in the 
rural municipalities. 
Additionally, the integration of obligatory tests (integrated impact analysis) that measure ecological 
impacts and determine economic effects of land development projects and their advantages for 
municipalities could be considered (Schweppe-Kraft et al., 2008). Another option would be to support 
cooperation networks of neighboring authorities on the development of commercial areas - sharing of 
costs and revenues (European Commission, 2012). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper was to empirically study and quantify the effect of BIC area change on municipal 
business tax revenues. Based on a dataset for Bavaria covering years 2009-2013, we find an average 
effect of about 13 € per m2 of BIC area increase. The significant and positive effect is confirmed in the 
robustness checks. However, the size of the coefficient seems to be driven by the main cities and reduces 
when these are dropped from the sample. Additional analyses involving interaction dummies for 
different area types support these findings. There exist strong differences in the tax effects of land 
consumption between urban and rural municipalities.  
Land consumption in cities and municipal agglomerations thus generates more business tax revenues 
than in rural areas. In terms of policy implications, this suggests that a scheme involving tradable 
development permits would have a redistributive effect – profits from land consumption will be partly 
redirected from urban and densely populated municipalities to areas that are less populous. The urban 
municipalities would buy planning permits from rural areas once their contingents are exhausted and as 
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long as it is profitable to do so. The rural areas would then have an alternative source of revenue and 
will not be bound to increase land consumption in the hope to attract investors. 
Furthermore, the comparison with the costs of first time land development suggests that the rural 
municipalities might see their land development projects not bring the expected profits. This confirms 
the hypothesis about the “ruinous competition” between the rural municipalities. 
Nevertheless, our results need to be interpreted with caution. Even though we took much care in trying 
to prove the robustness of our results, the heterogeneity of the Bavarian municipalities makes it difficult 
to derive general statements. In addition, due to the attributes of the land use data, we are only able to 
assess the tax revenue effect of the realized land consumption, and not of the initial efforts of the 
municipalities to develop land.  
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